Grab your sunglasses and your sun tan lotion because we are headed to the Hawaiian islands..oh don't forget your calculator.
Energy production in HI sparks the imagination. Think of all the natural resources available: Wind, Solar, Geothermal (big island), Hydro, biomass, ocean thermal, and tidal. So where then does all the energy come from? The vast majority is from petroleum, shipped in and refined locally.
Here is a breakdown of power production from this HI government source:
If we make a quick calculation and solve for the equivalent MWe plant size we can get an idea of the size of plant to cover an entire Island's production or to cover the production from oil import. See also the annual cost (2007) of the imported oil. (Assumes 100% availability of the plant and average power use (no peaking))
A couple of notes as we take a look at the data. Existing plant capacity seems adequate especially considering that energy use is down since 2007. This may be the reason why there is not a big driver to radically change how HI produces energy. Notice that the use of municipal solid waste in Honolulu produces energy equivalent to a 35MWe plant. Trash is a big deal in HI and it is getting worse.
Municipal Solid Waste
Honolulu makes up 80 percent of Hawaii's population and generates nearly 1.6 million tons of garbage a year. More than a third of the trash is incinerated to generate electricity. The remaining garbage is sent to the 21-year-old Waimanalo Gulch landfill on the island of Oahu's southwestern coast. Monday's agreement between the city and Chutz' firm requires the garbage that cannot be burned to be sent to the Waimanalo Gulch landfill, which must close by July 2012. Around that same time, the city hopes to start operating a third trash furnace at its electricity-generating plant in Kapolei, allowing the burning of about 902,000 tons a year.
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Nuclear Computer Systems--Complex but it has been done before
Dan Yurman recently featured a New York Times report on NRC and other regulators concern about the complexity and independence of computer systems for new reactor designs, specifically Areva. Such concern is not unexpected. It seems that the NRC and the nuclear industry is facing some of the same issues encountered by the FDA and regulated Biotech and Pharmaceutical manufacturing.
Clearly Biotech and Nuclear are different. When it comes to automated systems there are plenty of similarities across multiple industries:
-Data Integrity
-System Access and Security
-Hardware and Architecture Infrastructure
-Human Machine Interfaces
-Virtual Machines and/or servers (a key area for separation of systems and functionality)
-Operational or functional requirements
-Alarms and warnings with reporting and automated actions
-Electronic signatures, audit trails, and record keeping
Another similarity is the CFR requirement to verify and validate computer systems in both industries with plenty of regulatory oversite to go around for all. Biotech and Pharma has had many years to embrace very highly automated manufacturing practices. (Note: glossary of terms at end of article) PLCs and VSCs interact with the DCS and BAS/BMS. The DCS interfaces with the MES. The MES exchanges information with corporate IT networks. Most of that data is GMP and is therefore subject to regulation. A risk based approach (nothing new for Nuclear) is emphasized for determining critical functionality in order to best apply QA scrutiny to Engineerings plans and testing, but in the end everything is tested via commissioning and qualification. Call it validation or call it verification, the computer systems must be verified.
I should clarify the statement that everything is tested....Software functionality is verified, but not every aspect of every automated system can be tested. That would be a poor application of our Engineering and Quality expertise. Use of Vendor quality assessments and commercial off the shelf designations allow us to focus on project or system customization and configuration. Software coding standards and design documentation allow for consistent software design. Clear user and functional requirements allow for design and code review to ensure that the design meets the intended purpose, is per design standards, and is testable.
Biotech and Pharma have done a masterful job working with industry and the regulators to develop consensus standards such as the ISPE GAMP (Good Automation Manufacturing Practices) Guides. NQA-1 might not be our only answer. Consensus or best practice guides should be available to help the Nuclear industry navigate through the use and verification of automated systems and even digital instrument and control conversion.
System complexity and the differentiation between Safety and Non-safety systems should be addressed in a cooperative manner between the regulators and the multiple reactor and automated system vendors. Clearly concerns such as touch screen control and "smart" systems that automatically point to alarms or out of tolerance parameters and events will be a recurring theme across all new builds and conversions. Whether it is Safety or not does not alleviate the requirement for the automated system to work. Therefore good requirements and good standards are required to handle the control room of the future...one without individual or dedicated switches, lights, knobs, and control wires.
See my previous posts on Digital Instrumentation and Control Upgrades and Electrical and Water Cyber security-- Time to innovate
See a related post on Securing critical digital assets at nuclear power plants
over at at Cool Hand Nuke, a nuclear energy jobs portal and a whole lot more.
Glossary:
PLC-Programable Logic Controller
VSC-Vendor Supplied Controller
DCS-Distributed Control System
BAS-Building Automation System
BMS-Building Management System
MES-Manufacturing Execution System
GMP-Good Manufacturing Practices (Designated as Critical or Safety systems for nuclear)
Clearly Biotech and Nuclear are different. When it comes to automated systems there are plenty of similarities across multiple industries:
-Data Integrity
-System Access and Security
-Hardware and Architecture Infrastructure
-Human Machine Interfaces
-Virtual Machines and/or servers (a key area for separation of systems and functionality)
-Operational or functional requirements
-Alarms and warnings with reporting and automated actions
-Electronic signatures, audit trails, and record keeping
Another similarity is the CFR requirement to verify and validate computer systems in both industries with plenty of regulatory oversite to go around for all. Biotech and Pharma has had many years to embrace very highly automated manufacturing practices. (Note: glossary of terms at end of article) PLCs and VSCs interact with the DCS and BAS/BMS. The DCS interfaces with the MES. The MES exchanges information with corporate IT networks. Most of that data is GMP and is therefore subject to regulation. A risk based approach (nothing new for Nuclear) is emphasized for determining critical functionality in order to best apply QA scrutiny to Engineerings plans and testing, but in the end everything is tested via commissioning and qualification. Call it validation or call it verification, the computer systems must be verified.
I should clarify the statement that everything is tested....Software functionality is verified, but not every aspect of every automated system can be tested. That would be a poor application of our Engineering and Quality expertise. Use of Vendor quality assessments and commercial off the shelf designations allow us to focus on project or system customization and configuration. Software coding standards and design documentation allow for consistent software design. Clear user and functional requirements allow for design and code review to ensure that the design meets the intended purpose, is per design standards, and is testable.
Biotech and Pharma have done a masterful job working with industry and the regulators to develop consensus standards such as the ISPE GAMP (Good Automation Manufacturing Practices) Guides. NQA-1 might not be our only answer. Consensus or best practice guides should be available to help the Nuclear industry navigate through the use and verification of automated systems and even digital instrument and control conversion.
System complexity and the differentiation between Safety and Non-safety systems should be addressed in a cooperative manner between the regulators and the multiple reactor and automated system vendors. Clearly concerns such as touch screen control and "smart" systems that automatically point to alarms or out of tolerance parameters and events will be a recurring theme across all new builds and conversions. Whether it is Safety or not does not alleviate the requirement for the automated system to work. Therefore good requirements and good standards are required to handle the control room of the future...one without individual or dedicated switches, lights, knobs, and control wires.
See my previous posts on Digital Instrumentation and Control Upgrades and Electrical and Water Cyber security-- Time to innovate
See a related post on Securing critical digital assets at nuclear power plants
over at at Cool Hand Nuke, a nuclear energy jobs portal and a whole lot more.
Glossary:
PLC-Programable Logic Controller
VSC-Vendor Supplied Controller
DCS-Distributed Control System
BAS-Building Automation System
BMS-Building Management System
MES-Manufacturing Execution System
GMP-Good Manufacturing Practices (Designated as Critical or Safety systems for nuclear)
Labels:
computer system,
IVV,
NQA-1,
validation,
verification
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